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THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENT AID: 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN RURAL WEST AFRICA
by
THOMAS BIERSCHENK, GEORG ELWERT and DIRK KOHNERT
1. Definition of the Problem
Since the seventies, international development aid has been concentrated on 
the countries south of the Sahara. The aim of this aid has been to stop the 
desperate deterioration of the economic situation and especially of the living 
conditions of the majority of the population of Africa. However, both 
international donor organizations and African governments are increasingly 
coming to recognize that this aid has largely failed to achieve its objectives (see 
World Bank, 19971; UNDP, 1991; EGA 1989).
For new approaches to development policy to offer any promise of success, 
they need to be based on analyses of the socio-economic conditions and 
consequences of policies pursued to date. Besides a universal criticism of 
development aid as such2, sociological research has either concentrated on 
individual case studies, or has attempted to analyse the Status Quo by means of 
cross-sectional evaluations of specific project types. Process-orientated analyses 
of the cumulative effects over time of successful as well as failed projects have 
been totally neglected. Many sociologists and ethnologists take the view that 
development aid is simply "grafted" onto the essential structural characteristics 
of historical and contemporaneous African societies, enabling a simple analysis of 
these societies to be undertaken, without due consideration to the overall effects 
of development aid. In those cases — mostly outside the major current of 
sociology and ethnology — where aspects of development aid have been 
subjected to sociological analysis, the studies have concentrated mainly on the 
reasons for the failure of individual aid measures. By contrast, this article 
proceeds from two fundamental considerations. Firstly, we hold that
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for at least thirty years now, development aid has been a constituent component 
of social relationships in many African countries; its importance for the social 
development process cannot be over-estimated. There is no doubt that the 
development conditions of African countries are to a great extent dependent on 
the exchange relationships within the world market and the protectionist policies 
of the industrialized nations. However, the recognition of this fact should not 
allow a sociology of developing countries to ignore internal development factors 
or to behave as though development aid were simply an epi-phenomenon. 
Precisely the state classes, the role of which has once more come to the fore in 
recent studies (cf. e.g. Bayart, 1989) frequently owe their political survival - at 
least indirectly - to development aid. It not only created the possibility of 
independent development of these rapidly expanding state bureaucratic classes, 
whose rule is legitimized in no small measure by projects financed by 
development aid. It is also an important element in the anchoring of a clientelist 
logic in social relationships within these classes, between the state apparatus and 
the population, as well as between donors and the representatives of the state 
class. Today, on all social levels of African development administration, the 
essential "development deficit" is regarded as being a lack of (financial) means. 
The solution called for is therefore transfer payments (from the donor institutions 
to the African governments; from the African centralized states to their 
populations). Depending on the various political viewpoints, this transfer of 
resources is then often legitimized with the settlement of old debts (e. g. for 
colonial exploitation or the slave trade - see Resolution of OAU Conference in 
Abuja, June 1991) or with a moral obligation to provide charitable aid. At the 
same time, projects financed by foreign aid contribute considerably to the 
legitimation of state rule - both in Europe and abroad.
This leads on to our second point: sociological and socio-anthropological 
studies of development aid and its consequences for the social structures of 
African (and other) societies must not be limited to the evaluation of individual 
development projects - mostly on the commission of the particular donor. There 
exists already a vast body of these studies collecting dust on the shelves of the 
national and international donor organizations, mostly without any recognizable 
consequences for project execution or any relationship to more general questions 
of anthropology and sociology. Sociological analyses of the consequences of 
development aid need rather to be pursued as fundamental research, opening up 
more generalized, comparative sociological questions Nor can they be aimed at 
establishing an anthropology concept which has recently become fashionable 
amongst anthropologists, as a type of applied support discipline for a successful 
development policy. If the concept of "development anthropology" is to have any 
significance at all, then this can be
only in the sense of viewing the "development aid world" from an anthropological 
perspective, i. e. from a perspective which gives equally serious consideration to all 
the groups involved - experts and bureaucrats, farmers and shepherds, poor and 
rich, men and women etc. — with their own particular strategies of action and 
cultural attitudes (see Bierschenk 1991).
This perspective of a "sociology and social anthropology of the development aid 
world" formed the basis of a research project covering several countries of West 
Africa which was carried out by the authors between 1984 and 1990 together with a 
number of colleagues, initially at the University of Bielefeld and then at the Free 
University of Berlin. In the course of this project, it gradually became clear that our 
perspectives are also shared by a considerable number of researchers especially in 
Europe - who consciously ignore the boundaries between anthropology and 
development sociology.3 The work on this project was, for us, a learning process. 
At first sight, several widespread criticisms of development aid seemed to be 
confirmed, but on closer analysis it proved impossible to generalize them. In the 
case of the Igala in Nigeria, for example, the development aid projects were 
concentrated along the major traffic routes, with the hinterland being neglected. In 
the case of the Tiv, an acephalous ethnic group in the middle belt of Nigeria, 
however, this tendency to concentration was not in evidence (see Mönikes, 1988). 
The thesis that it is key people who benefit most from the utilization of the positive 
effects of development aid was confirmed in the case of Benin, Niger and Sierra 
Leone (see Bierschenk/Forster 1987; Forster 1988; Metz 1986). Who these key 
people are, though, is something that this type of project is unable to generalize on 
or to  predict.  On the contrary,  our interest was  focussed on very specific 
strategies of the pursuit of self-interest. The dissolution of extended families, a 
frequent consequence of development aid, could also be observed (see Laabs 1987 
and Peters 1987 on the margmalization of the physically handicapped and the 
migration of active young men in Sierra Leone). But Momkes's (1988) case study on 
Nigeria showed that this trend, which could be observed among the Tiv, was 
actually reversed in the hierarchically organized Igala; here, certain extended family 
groups tended to be strengthened. At the same time, in this ethnic group there was a 
strengthening of the economic position of women, who were able to turn their 
traditional separation from the husbands' budgeting to their advantage. Despite a 
similar role-division between men and women in one of the regions of Benin, 
Agossou (1987) observed a weakening in the economic position of women, a 
development which, in different forms, we also found in southern Niger (Kremer 
1987) and in the south of Burkina Faso (Obbelode  1988).  The  fact  that there  are  
counter-trends  to  the general phenomenon of impoverishment - as described by 
Metz (1986) with regard to forms of women's resistance, and Scherler (1987) on the 
enrichment strategy of
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a category of women in Sierra Leone - bodes caution against generalizing about 
hermeneutic models.
Thus, little remained of our original working hypotheses. Distinctive local 
social dynamics or transformation processes came to the fore (Zitelmann 1989). 
However, this meant that two working hypotheses from the original project 
took on even greater emphasis: the importance of the "grey (hidden) budget" of 
development aid - hitherto ignored by political science and sociology - and the 
almost systematic disregard of long-term dynamics in project-planning. In the 
following, we elaborate on these points in detail. An analysis of the 
bureaucratization effect caused by the "grey budget" of development aid, and of 
the failure of pre-planned aid due to the complexity of social dynamics will be 
followed by a description of this social structure which has been labelled 
"administrative development". In conclusion, we will risk formulating some 
suggestions for practical implementation.
2. The Grey Budget and the Bureaucratization of Development
In the least developed countries (LLDCs), the majority of which are African 
countries, development aid has now assumed major macro-economic dimen-
sions. In the seventies and eighties, official aid (ODA) of the donor countries 
alone amounted, on an average, to one half of the gross investment and annual 
import volume of these recipient countries, not including technical and food 
aid. This has led to a considerable growth of money in the hands of govern-
ments. The dynamic "strategic group" (Evers/Schiel 1988), the officials and 
graduates, have used this opportunity to extend the state apparatus, including 
para-state organizations. This tends to lead to a pattern in which internal 
government income is scarcely adequate to cover current costs - especially for 
the salaries of public employees. As a result, the regimes concerned face the 
constant latent threat of being overthrown, as evidenced by the example of 
Benin 1989-90. As a result not only every new government investment, but 
even the servicing of earlier investments, and in some countries even the 
financing of current personnel costs, is dependent on foreign finance. In other 
words, the transfer payments from development aid form, in many recipient 
countries, a "grey" portion of state income, approaching or even exceeding the 
amount of income from taxation, customs duties, profits etc. (see table 1). 
Development aid has thus become a central aspect of the macro-economic 
reproduction structures of black African countries.
In a political-economic sense, the effects and functions of development aid in 
the recipient countries are comparable to those of other state revenues - e. g. from 
oil production (cf. Bierschenk 1984). However, a central difference to oil 
revenues - which are bound to indigenous resources - lies in the diversity of
Table 1 - Ratio of official government income to development aid income (ODA) in selected African 
countries, 1988 (in $ m)
Current total of central 
government income 
% GDP
A.  Countries studied in the framework of 
our research project
Burkina Faso 298 16..0 17..1 90 %
Benin Guinea-
Bissau
162 
100
9..0 
13..8
12..0
' 8.2'
75 % 
168 %
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone
120 
102
0.4
7..3
18.5
7.3
2 %
100 %
B.   Extreme cases
Mozambique 
Somalia
886 
433
70..6 
42..9
22.1'
8.2'
320 % 
523 %
Tanzania 978 31.2 15..2" 205 %
' provisional estimates (incl. published budget aid of donors).
Source: calculated from: World Bank, "World Development Report 1991"; OECD/DAC, 1990; EIU, 
Country Reports, 1990/91; IMF, "Government Finance Statistical Yearbook", 1990.
possible external sources of development aid. The second "grey" budget is 
largely controlled by the donors, and is generally only loosely co-ordinated on 
the national level. On the one hand, this leads to specific imbalances in the 
distribution of projects, the effects of which we will look at in more detail later. 
But the prime effect of this massive, uncontrolled inflow of aid is to give rise to 
two initially apparently paradoxical tendencies.
On the level of national development planning, there is a systematic sabotage 
of all efforts towards co-ordinating development planning. It is generally more 
advantageous for a national authority to develop direct relationships with 
foreign donors than to maintain them with the appropriate central planning 
authorities. Even within the structure of an authority, this tendency towards the 
independence of individual units is continued, for instance where a regional 
agricultural authority (or parts of it) succeeds in winning a project for itself and 
thus having at its disposal considerably greater resources than the ministry in the 
capital. This in turn arouses jealousy on the part of the central authority, which 
attempts to divert resources, using legal or illegal means as required. The 
ministry of planning - where one exists - is mostly powerless against this 
circumvention of legally anchored planning structures, particularly where it has 
no power to regulate the distribution of the "spoils" of development aid (see 
Beck 1991). In extreme cases, where
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foreign donors partially finance the development of regional planning structures, 
as in Guinea Bissau, the very survival of these material and personnel structures 
stands and falls with the flow of development aid. This uncertainty has a 
negative effect on the morale and personnel structure of the class of development 
officials, formed over decades of painstaking work, as described by Friedrich 
(1991) in the case of the regional development of Guinea Bissau.
A second consequence of development aid is the nationalization and 
bureaucratization of development. This is only an apparent contradiction to the 
systematic destruction of development planning on the national level. The 
massive growth of employment figures in the government and semi-government 
sectors of most African states from the sixties onwards bear testimony to this 
trend. In Benin, for example, — despite repeated complaints from the donors -
the number of employees in the civil service has more than doubled over the last 
ten years from 20,000 (1990) to almost 50,000 (1990). This has been made 
possible by the fact that LLDCs are required to finance only a minimum amount 
of government investment from internal funds, and the current costs (salaries 
etc.) are funded increasingly - more or less hidden - out of development aid. In 
addition to this, every development aid project, whether a successful one or a 
failure, leaves in place institutional and personnel structures which, in themselves, 
are an important factor in bureaucratization. On the level of political discussion, 
this leads to a situation in which "development" is frequently defined as "projects 
carried out by the (centralized) state". For African farmers, administrative 
buildings and the vehicles of civil servants are much greater symbols of 
government-induced "development" than structural economic or social changes 
(see Elwert/Elwert-Kretschmer 1991).
Development aid primarily involves the infusion of money into current social 
processes. In this context, venality is probably the most obvious undesired side-
effect. Venality means that social goods and services become tradeable. In such a 
case, increased money does not lead to increased investment in the productive 
sector, but to a transformation of social relationships such as marriage, love, the 
law and religion into services which can be bought and sold. That is, it leads to 
corruption, prostitution, inflation of the costs of rituals and the ability to 
purchase God's grace by pilgrimages and magic. Depending on the particular 
power structures, the money flows into the power centres (Bierschenk 1987; 
Crehan/von Oppen 1988; Elwert 1989). Since development aid is not the only —
and generally not even the most important — source from which money flows 
into society, it would be wrong to blame individual development projects for the 
growth of venality. However, where the establishment of development 
bureaucracies weakens the social control of the powerful, while the money 
supply continues to expand, development aid cannot be totally exonerated. This 
can be seen from the development of land
rights in one of the southern provinces of Benin. Between formal land 
ownership, entered in a land register and the informal factual land-ownership of 
farmers, there has developed a "usurped" right of property by government, 
regional or agricultural administrations. Anybody claiming rights to property 
and offering sufficient bribes can obtain a stamped property certificate by 
passing the land registration system - even if these rights are contested by the 
traditional authorities. The validity of this new property certificate is then 
enforced (in return for continuous bribery) by the police. In recent years, big 
businessmen and highly placed government officials have thus been able to 
secure for themselves a large portion of the most valuable land (see Elwert et al. 
1989). Venality, though, is not merely corruption. Other social relationships, 
too, are increasingly organized on a money basis.
The problematic nature of these transformations is immediately apparent. 
The new tradeable character of social ties frees people from old obligations and is 
perceived as liberation. Access to resources seems to be facilitated. In the 
course of time, it becomes clear that these institutions, which are now subject to 
"market forces", also have a function in securing trust. But trust is not a vague 
emotional variable, it is also the basis of social interactions - even in the markets.
By contrast, the spread of venality produces long-term insecurity. This 
spawns the need for quick, simplistic explanations of the inexplicable. If an 
explanation can be found, it focusses on various fears, e.g. in charges of 
witchcraft (see Kohnert 1983) or, for instance, in the widespread fear of illness 
brought on by black magic in West Benin. Headaches, feeling ill, loss of 
concentration, unhappiness and other non-specific ailments are then attributed to 
the black magic purchased by imaginary enemies with which, for example, 
anonymous malefactors have invisibly split the head of the patient. The evil, 
the money and the irresponsibility of individuals, which already create so 
much insecurity in love and law, are thus convincingly linked to other social 
spheres. Insecurity is also a strong impetus to the creation or re-creation of 
(imaginary) communities. In Africa, the eighties were characterized not only by 
a growth of venality but also by the growing importance of various types of "in-
groups", e. g. Islamic and Christian sects, the revival of traditional religions and 
ethno-nationalist movements. Thus, for example, discontent with the 
increasing corruption of government officials was an important ground for 
many Fulani in Benin to come together in the late eighties to form an ethnic 
pressure group (see Bierschenk 1989).
The intention of these communities is to (re-)establish relationships of trust; 
they aim to separate the monetary and social spheres. It is noticeable that many of 
these groups have rigid moral attitudes on the use of money. Money ought to 
regulate only economic systems (Elwert 1989). The same criticism has been
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pronounced by Jehova's Witnesses, which have been forced underground, or 
radical Islamic groups in Benin, Niger and Nigeria, which - in consideration of 
their foreign paymasters - also work underground. The continued attractiveness 
of Marxism re-formulated into a para-religious belief among political youth 
sects (as in parts of the PCD in Benin) can be explained by the same 
phenomenon.
It is not surprising that religious groups and local self-help groups of this 
kind frequently become partners of development aid organizations. As they 
develop international moral-economic structures, they are more attractive and 
reliable partners for the development aid agencies than most of the official 
bodies.
As compared to government projects, European non-government organiza-
tions (NGOs) claim to be more flexible and less subject to the compulsion to 
co-operate with the elites. Nevertheless, even these NGOs cannot escape co-
operating with the local elites if they wish to implement successfully a 
community development project, as the structures of decision-making within 
the community are stratified according to power, rank and economic importance.
Development aid by self-help groups and NGOs, then, is only to a limited 
extent able to break out of these structures which, as we have shown, determine 
overall development aid policy. Self-help groups do not live in isolation. They 
interact with a social environment which is characterized by the spread of 
venality (Amselle 1988, Neubert 1989). The more "developed" they become, 
the greater their integration into the "external world", the greater becomes the 
probability of corruption and prestige consumption being considered as "normal" 
characteristics of their societes. A typical example is the Kibanguist movement 
in Zaire, which was transformed from a national, Christian-protestant liberation 
movement in the colonial era into an established ideological pillar of the 
Mobutu regime, that now even massively exploits its own members (Asch 1983). 
This reveals the difficulties inherent in an attempt to transform self-help groups 
into the other "normality" of communal self-government based on the rule of 
law and democratic public information.
3. The Consequences of the Static View of Development Aid
3.1  The Traditionalism of Development Aid and the Dynamics of African 
Societies
The thesis of the traditionalism of African societies, widely propounded by 
development planners, can be countered by its very opposite — that the world of 
development aid is very much more traditionalist and closed to change than
all of the societies which this development aid attempts to dynamize. There are 
very few development experts who recognise that current development aid 
projects are just the most recent in a historical series of massive external 
interventions since the beginning of the colonial era, which have overlapped in 
time and space, and which either cancel each other out or reinforce one 
another.
This inability to learn from history, which characterizes the world of 
planned development, has been frequently documented e.g. by Richards 
(1985) for Sierra Leone, Kohnert (1988) for Guinea Bissau and Norris (in 
preparation) for Togo. It has been shown how the failure of a particular 
technological intervention frequently leads to another project with a different 
technology. But after some time, this new attempt also fails, whereupon the 
original approach is adopted once again. The fact that this had already failed in the 
past has been forgotten in the meantime - not by the farmers, but by 
development aid institutions and their experts. Thus for example, current 
animal fraction projects could learn from the failure of similar "mixed farming" 
projects in Togo during the German colonial period, and by their evaluation 
reports prepared at that time (cf. Norris, in preparation). In general, the failure of 
a development project tends to lead to changes in inputs and in presentation 
rather than in the project approach. On closer scrutiny, a "community 
development" project of the past looks exactly like a modern day "basic needs" 
or "participation" project. What distinguishes them is rather their rhetoric.
This inability to learn from the past is primarily due to the fact that the 
development aid world has its own cognitive structures and its own communi-
cation channels. It pursues its own internal discourse, the central categories of 
which must be mastered. The reality which forms the frame of reference for 
the management and within which development projects are conceived (or 
implemented) is largely a derived reality, produced within this communication 
system itself. This goes undetected in developing countries because, unlike in 
Western societies, there exists no public debate in the absence of alternative 
channels of information or media of communication which could lead to 
differing perceptions of reality. Thus there is a lack of processes of deliberation 
which include perspectives other than those of the planning staffs . However, 
this lack of a response in development aid cannot be blamed on the experts 
alone. On the contrary, experts frequently show an amazing amount of 
flexibility, demonstrated, for instance, in their adaptation to physically and 
psychologically stressful, unaccustomed living conditions. Nor should the 
farmers be made responsible for the rigidity. The entrepreneurial dynamism of 
migrants and the rapid spread of economically viable innovations (from the 
distilleries, through the. bicycle to improved seed corn) provide sufficient
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testimony to this. However, planning processes per se display rigidity which 
contrasts with the flexibility of self-organized reproduction forms of farming 
communities.
3.2 The Historical Relevance and Complexity of African Societies
This criticism of the static view of development aid holds good not only for its 
implementation, but also for the perception of the social structures and 
dynamics of the recipient countries by the donors and experts. The latter tend 
rather to reinforce the existing social structures on which their terms of 
reference are frequently implicitly based. The failure of development projects is 
frequently explained by the "inert" structures of these supposedly traditional 
societies. "Development" or "modernization", by contrast, is presented as the 
"dynamization" of these inert structures by means of external intervention. In 
reality, this view of traditional African society as static is a myth: African 
societies have been changing both before, during and after the colonial era (Elwert 
1983b).
This metaphor of the dormant society which could be made to move only by 
forceful external impulses was, for example, used to present the plantation 
economy of the Ivory Coast as a development model. French and World Bank 
experts alike recommended this as a model, as the development strategies 
pursued there had had a remarkable effect in increasing the income of the rural 
population. A group of French social anthropologists looked closely into the 
ethnological and historical reports on the farmers of this region. They showed 
that the development towards a plantation system which was competitive on the 
world market had begun long before the colonial era and had, in fact, been 
initially resisted by the French colonial masters. However, once the obstinate 
African farmers had prevailed against the colonial masters by a mixture of 
obstruction and subversion, the "plantation economy" was adopted as an official 
development objective, becoming the object of government and development 
agency plans. The success of the plantation economy in the Ivory Coast is thus by 
no means primarily due to external impulses, but is an example of auto-
transformation (Chauveau 1985). Similar examples have also been reported from 
other West African countries, e. g. Nigeria (see Hogendorn 1966 and Kindler 
1986).
Like all other societies, African societies, too, have their own historical 
dynamics. In other words, they have dieir own forms of transformation, i. e. 
systematic ways of generating internal innovations and transforming external 
innovations. Seen from the outside this selective reception of innovations 
appears to be a sign of a sceptical approach to new technologies and new forms of 
social organization. From the inside, however, it proves, in some cases, to be
self-confident and creative form of dealing with innovations of external origin 
which are rapidly and flexibly adapted to local conditions. Where casual 
obervers see only rigid traditionalism, a closer look reveals significant transfor-
mations for the target group. And where the ignorant "expert" attributes the 
change only to his external impulse, frequently in reality this is only the 
continuation of a pre-colonial transformation pattern.
The academic study of development policy and its implementation have, to 
date, scarcely sought a theory of social development which would explain 
which social forms actually enable acceptance of innovations and self-organized 
control of economic development within a society. This is where our second 
thesis is of importance: African societies - like all other societies -are highly 
complex systems. Complex systems depend on control through self-organization. 
Each society is dependent for its reproduction on structures which operate in a 
similar manner to biological systems. It requires a continuous exchange with its 
environment. This environment includes both other societies and the natural 
environment. It also needs a self-reference and an awareness of its own 
boundaries. And finally it needs mechanisms for adaptation to ensure its 
continuous change in the wake of changing environmental conditions.
Each society - even a hunter and gatherer community - is thus an extremely 
complex whole. The wide diversity of its feedback and self-reference mechan-
isms make it practically impossible to predict developments on the basis of 
mechanical or linear development models. Thus, Mönikes (1988) has demon-
strated that against the planners' expectations the hierarchically structured 
Igala society in Nigeria tends to accept development aid packages in their 
entirety, while their acephalous neighbours, the Tiv, accept only specific 
partial aspects of development projects and adapt other aspects to the local 
conditions. We will return later to this process of "unravelling" development aid 
packages.
Another example can be seen in the numerous irrigation projects in West 
Africa which were intended to promote vegetable or rice cultivation by 
women. For a time, these projects were very successful: yields rose, and the 
possibilities of marketing surplusses increased considerably. This was precisely 
what had been intended by the development planners. However, this led to 
unexpected developments: the new wealth of the farmers' wives aroused the 
envy of other groups, for instance their husbands and young or experienced 
men. This, in turn, led to revolutionary changes in the legal structure which 
were frequently veiled by religious changes, e. g. the transition to Islam. This in 
turn led to the development of a new property structure, with the men now 
becoming the owners of the irrigated land and taking over the lucrative 
production and marketing of rice themselves. Social changes of this kind,
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which are frequently detectable only in the long term, as they occur with a 
time-lag of a decade, are another typical example of the foreseeable and 
unintended consequences of development policy intervention (Obbelode 1988).
The classic answer of development policy to such a diversion of project 
objectives is that it is simply impossible to foresee all eventualities. Then 
solutions are sought in technological terms. However, in our opinion, a better 
answer would lie in strengthening the ability of social systems for adaptation: for 
self-controlled trial selection of technologies, or generally the ability for self-
organization.
The problem of massive external intervention can perhaps best be highlighted 
by a further example. In the case of famine, aid organizations tend to group the 
people into camps and allocate them food through ration cards. There are good 
logistical arguments for such an approach. Famine aid projects are therefore, 
regarded as a project type where experts in logistics are in demand, but certainly 
not social scientists or anthropologists conversant with local culture. Compared 
to the difficulty of transporting food to these camps, the distribution within the 
camps appears to pose no problems. Elaborate social structures and division of 
labour do not seem to be required to this end. Even the socialization of children 
can be reduced to the ability to take food and to beg. Frequently, the following 
then happens: with the onset of the next monsoon, the people are unable to 
return to their villages immediately. Their social structures are geared to other 
ends: their children educated to other strategies. They have no means of 
production or security. They lack security primarily because most famines in 
Africa are connected with wars. The people consequently remain in camps for 
years. This leads to the development of "spoon-fed" societies which can no 
longer really be considered as societies in the sense of self-organized systems. 
The social institutions to ensure the adaptation to new environmental conditions 
by internal differentiation and the creation of new rules, have been destroyed (on 
Niger, cf. Spittler 1989, and on Ethiopia and Somalia, cf. Zitelmann 1988).
In a more abstract form, the problem of spoon-fed societies can be formu-
lated as follows: in the worst case, external intervention in complex dynamic 
systems results in the destruction of the capacity of a society for self-
organization; in more favourable cases, external intervention simply has no 
consequences. Whatever the case, an observation of African societies as self-
organized systems must lead to the statement that the result of external 
intervention cannot be generally predicted. The application of a specific set of 
intervention instruments does not automatically lead to definite socio-struc-tural 
results. Rather this depends on the already existing modes of production and 
transformation. A typology of these modes of transformation would of
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necessity be more complex than the mere bipolar distinction between pure 
rejection of external impulses and their positive adoption and internalization. 
There is at least one other type of transformation process which is characterized 
by an alternation between differing structures of production and social 
reproduction. These structures are stable in themselves, but are (temporarily) 
relinquished under stress in favour of other organizational forms. In the history 
of many rural groups in Africa, we repeatedly find periods of opening to the 
market followed by periods of a return to subsistence production and, following 
that, renewed opening to the market (Crehan/v. Oppen 1988).
3.3 Administrative versus Indigenous Innovation
Development aid projects are almost always based on an approach which 
can be described as "administrative innovation": experts define a problem, seek 
a solution, and then implement it. The solution can consist of technical or social 
innovations. An example of a social innovation would be the introduction of 
collectives - a project which, from the sixties onwards, has always been pursued 
with great, but usually unfulfilled expectations.
This type of administrative innovation is also to be found in European 
history. It characterized Russian Tsarism and Stalinism, but in German history 
there are certainly also positive examples, such as the Hardenberg reforms. 
Predominant in European history, however, was another type of innovation, 
which we could call "indigenous, independent innovation". This consists of a 
wide range of differing solutions developed simultaneously, from which a 
systematic selection takes place. The selection is not directly linked with the 
variations, e.g. if something appears ineffective it is immediately excluded 
from the list of possible solutions. If the appropriate communication processes 
are available, this simultaneous development of different solution proposals 
allows for an exchange of experiences and especially the modification of 
individual attempts at solutions. In the long term, these communication 
processes lead to a selection. This can be illustrated with the example of the 
steam engine. This was by no means invented by James Watt on his own. In the 
18th century there were a dozen models competing with one another, from 
which James Watt's design - which also incorporated ideas from his com-
petitors - emerged successful (Lilley 1973). In the natural sciences, this kind of 
interplay between variation and selection is called "evolution".
It is difficult to understand why administrative innovation plays such a 
dominant role in the thought of "experts" and African decision makers. 
Certainly the internal structure of the authoritarian African "peasant state" 
(Splittler 1982) is one explanatory factor. That the political orientation of the 
particular regime is not the determinant factor is evident from the fact that
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states with quite different structures and political systems show the same 
dependence on state-directed innovations. The example of the "training and visit 
system" propagated by the World Bank with missionary zeal, a model of 
administratively-directed innovation, points to other determinants (see Kohnert 
1990). The explanation must therefore lie, at least in part, in the structure of the 
development world. The insecurity of experts with regard both to a social 
environment which is alien to them, and to the benefit of their activities, 
demands the ritualization of these and the erection of barriers against potential 
competing (indigenous) knowledge systems — e. g. the farmers' knowledge of 
nee cultivation (see Kohnert, 1988, on Guinea Bissau, and Richards, 1985, on 
Sierra Leone). In this way an imaginary world is created, in which the success of 
the expert is no longer measured primarily by the actual degree to which he 
solves the problem of the target group, but by derivatives such as the "activist 
approach", the elegance and familiarity with the rituals of development 
management etc.
3.4 Environmental Management and Self-Management
The same problem is visible in the management of rain and drought problems. 
In large tracts of Africa, the problem is not so much one of too little, but of 
irregular rainfall. Let us take the broad belt of areas with precipitation around 
500 mm per annum. This amount of rainfall is sufficient for a flourishing 
agriculture and wine production on the slopes of the Upper Rhine Plain. The 
problem is that in the Sahel sometimes half of the annual precipitation falls in 
one day. And it is not unlikely that while one district is suffering this 
cloudburst, the neighbouring area receives no rain at all. We must thus imagine 
the rainfall map as a very spotted leopard skin. The average rainfall figures give 
a mean value, but provide little in formation on the rainfall in individual areas. 
It can also happen that rain falls only after the end of the growing season. The 
only regular feature of the rainfall in virtually all parts of tropical Africa is its 
irregularity. The inhabitants have devised specific strategies in response to this. 
For the cattle rearers it is mobility - which we refer to as nomadism. For 
domestic political reasons of control — camouflaged by the official argument of 
the allocation cost of "modern" infrastructures -most African governments have 
a manifest interest in turning the nomads into settled residents. But this means 
that even in the absence of rainfall in the areas of their present settlement, nomads 
are unable to seek greener pastures in their old travelling grounds. Mobility is, 
however, by no means a strategy of security only pursued by the nomads, but 
can also be found among "settled" African small farmers. When one is in need, 
it is important to have the possibility, through relatives, clientelist relationships, 
or by migrant labour, to
be able to profit directly from the better distribution of rainfall in other areas. If 
the labour systems used in development projects now force the people to stay in 
one place all year, the social relationships which are the preconditions for this 
kind of mobility fall into decay through disuse (cf. Lachenmann 1988). A further 
example shall illustrate how for a long time African farmers have used strategies 
to optimize their security to cope with the vagaries of nature and human life. 
These strategies, however, run against the major trend of promoting the "green 
revolution" by high yielding varieties etc. There are good reasons for seed 
projects to be restricted to only a small number of varieties — and in some cases 
even to one single variety. In this way, the farmers can be instructed to observe the 
best sowing and harvesting times, and fertilizers and pesticides can be precisely 
targeted to the intended production. To the irritation of the experts, however, in 
many regions farmers continue to use different varieties and do not wish to give 
up this diversity. Paul Richards (in print) has studied this kind of agricultural 
production by rice farmers in Sierra Leone. He discovered that these farmers -
against the advice of the development experts - pursue a type of agricultural 
production which can be described as a local "green revolution". Yields similar 
to those of the well-known "green revolution" of high-yielding varieties 
dependent on high fertilizer and pesticide inputs are achieved. This diversity of 
varieties makes sense when one realises that in some cases the rain comes on 
time, so that a longer growing period can be utilized, wheres in other cases the 
rain falls so late that quick-maturing varieties are needed. Some fields are on dry 
land, some are occasionally subject to flooding — whereas others are marshy. For 
each of these soil conditions there are specific varieties which flourish only in 
those locations. The farmers have even developed varieties which can float to the 
surface in the event of a flood. At first sight, one variety of rice appears 
particularly unsuitable because of its long grains. The cultivation of this variety 
seems irrational, since this rice is extraordinarily difficult to harvest, to thresh 
and to process. What is more, the gene threatens to spread to other higher 
yielding rice varieties. However, the farmers have a good reason to retain this 
rice variety in their armoury, for it is possible that a family may not have enough 
children to combat the worst enemy of the rice crop: birds. If there are no 
children to frighten off the birds, a variety of rice, e.g. long grain rice, is required 
which is immune to damage by birds.
4.  The Command State
A command state is one in which, despite a formal framework of laws and 
courts, the real structure of authority is characterized by obedience to arbitrary 
regulations and directives of officials. There is no separation of powers
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between the judiciary and the executive, and any action without explicit 
authorization or directive is illegal. Despite the democratization movements 
spreading from the capital cities, the fundamental reality in rural areas of many 
African countries is still the command state. The gap between the donors' 
expectation to handle things according to conventional administrative and legal 
procedures on the one hand and the reality of arbitrariness in the command 
states' bureaucracy on the other was filled by strategies of competition for 
project resources and by the emergence of social actors called "development 
brokers". For the donors, principles based on the rule of law, such as the 
binding of administrative actions to legal procedures and the provision of 
information to the public, are part of the natural, scarcely ever consciously 
formulated rules of the economic and political game. The confrontations 
surrounding projects, experienced by all experts, are therefore mostly classified 
as exceptions, personal mistakes or the "cultural heritage", without recognition 
being given to their systematic character. However, local development brokers, 
for instance, have a role to play in the social structure.
4.1 The Role of Local Development Brokers
To date, little attention has been given in the development policy literature to 
one particular strategic group. We shall call them "local development brokers". In 
Africa and (as Lenz 1988 demonstrates) also in some areas of Latin America, 
development aid has created a particular sociological type: the broker, mediating 
between potential project beneficiaries and potential project providers. In this 
sense, the majority of projects can be regarded as being "mediated". The 
geographical distribution of development projects depends frequently not so 
much on the existing infrastructures such as roads and rail links, but on the 
presence of possible groups of mediators. These can be the "sons of the village" 
as described by Athawet (1988) in the case of Benin. He was asked whether he, as 
an academic from the capital city, would be prepared to be adopted as one such 
fils du village, as it was automatically assumed that he had better contacts to the 
clientelist structure of the decision-makers in the capital. In cases where there are 
no local mediators, they can be created by the inclusion of outsiders (e. g. civil 
servants) in reciprocal or clientelist relationships (cf. Lenz 1988; Crehan/v. 
Oppen 1988). A good example of this is the case of the agricultural extension 
officers in the integrated rural development projects. In Benin, the latter were in 
demand by the target groups, less because of their (doubtful) advisory function in 
technical matters than for their role as mediators between farmers and 
government authority in social conflicts (Liihe 1990).
These mediation efforts are usually illegal, but advantageous for the brokers
concerned, and because they mostly operate clandestinely, they are virtually 
never mentioned in sociological analyses of development projects. This is 
regrettable, as it conceals the fact that the social category of the broker is not a 
necessary means of development. It is just as easy to conceive of open political 
systems for the distribution of project resources through markets, private 
services, etc. according to demand. The interaction of producers, extension 
services, the media, and democratic political institutions in Western countries is 
an example of the distribution of resources in accordance with needs and 
purchasing power. In our Western society, too, there are mediators, but they are 
not in a position to impose such a personalized clientelist monopoly of access 
upon an entire society as the brokers in the developing countries do.
4.2 Strategic Action Versus Consensus Action
Most development projects are still conceived as "integrated projects". This 
makes a great deal of sense, for many measures are really effective if combined, so 
they are bundled together into packages. Interestingly, however, the target 
groups usually unravel this package and select only individual measures which are 
then actually implemented. In general, therefore, projects neither fail 
completely, nor are they ever 100 % successful. Usually the success of a project 
is selective.
This unravelling of the packages is surprising in as far as all the participants 
are usually committed to a common rhetoric through specific procedures or 
methods of planning in which the "logical" interrelationship between objectives 
of the project is underlined.4 However, under this veil of a vain attempt at 
consensus, there is a great deal of in-fighting between the various strategic 
groups participating in a project. As an example, let us look at the installation of 
watering points for cattle farmers, as portrayed by Bierschenk (1988). The 
wives of the settled peasants wanted water for the household (they need a great 
deal of water, especially for washing). The farmers needed it for their vegetable 
cultivation; therefore they had an interest in ensuring that the watering points 
were laid as near to the village as possible, and that neither the watering points 
nor the vegetable fields were trampled by cattle. These interests clashed with 
those of the Fulani, cattle farmers, for whom the project was originally 
conceived. They, of course, needed watering points not in the vicinity of the 
villages, but near the cattle pastures. The European experts were under 
considerable pressure to produce results. They had to ensure a smooth flow of 
funds and the smooth running of operations on the ground; otherwise they were 
regarded as inefficient. This efficiency criterion, however, is the primary 
determinant of their careers. These considerations rather pointed to easily 
accessible watering points near major roads and traffic centres. The local 
politicians then had to weigh up these opposing interests, their central concern
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being the gaining of legitimacy and/or material advantages for their clients. 
From their perspectives - and in this they are not different from politicians in 
the donor countries — optimum solutions for them are usually achieved if the 
realisation of projects can actually be made visible, for instance by situating 
them on the major traffic routes.
That these interests are so divergent is something which often emerges only 
through sociological analysis.5 In the project, these hidden interests are 
expressed rather indirectly by promoting or blocking one alternative or another. 
The women lay their washing out around the watering points, either blocking 
the way of the cattle to the watering point or provoking a conflict which puts the 
cattle farmers in the wrong. The cattle farmers generally attempt to influence 
the decision-makers whom they consider to be relevant by giving them gifts. 
The male members of the peasant family are able to disrupt every decision-
making body until they can force an acceptable majority. The officials, on the 
other hand, can prevent the construction of any watering point by administrative 
delays. They can, for example, stipulate that the construction requires the 
clearance of a higher authority. They can stop projects because of supposedly 
insurmountable technical difficulties, etc.
Seen from this perspective, the project appears as an arena of differing 
strategies for action. Structural change is not determined by a negotiated social 
consensus, but by the competition between various conflicting and often hidden 
(group) interests, local knowledge, strategies, values. In other words, it would be 
wrong to regard the units of analysis, whether state, village or ethnic community, 
as homogeneous, with everybody pulling in the same direction (Chauveau 1985, 
Olivier de Sardan 1988). In particular, African villages should not be regarded as 
realms of solidarity, bus as realms of conflict (Kohnert 1982; 1988). The 
conflictual nature and heterogeneity of local social structures is, however, in 
general disregarded by development projects. Formulations which describe the 
target groups in the projects plans as "the population", "the poorest of the poor", 
"the African smallholder", etc. conceal more than they reveal. Just how different 
the interests of "the" target group can be comes to light at the latest when the 
project is implemented. The following is not untypical of the way things 
develop: In the first phase of an integrated rural development project, the better-
off farmers take loans, utilize the inputs provided and begin to produce more. 
Then, in the second phase, when the resources are spread more broadly because 
of the project objective of "participation", a decline is observable because the 
necessary resources are not available for the newcomer farmers to get a foothold 
on the ladder of the new production process. Flourishing development projects 
are characterized not only by high investments of the wealthy rural classes, but 
also by the urban classes, particularly government employees (on Benin, cf. e.g. 
Meissner 1990).
It is therefore very difficult to talk of the failure of a project. In any project 
there are definite winners: as a rule, these are the politicians and civil servants in 
the national decision-making structures, and also the richer and/or more 
influential strata of the target population, together with other beneficiaries not 
considered in the original project plan, such as blacksmiths who dismantle "lost" 
machines into scrap iron - which they then use as a raw material - and naturally 
also some customs officials . . .
4.3 Structures of Non-public Information
*
In essence, then, we find strategies here which always make use of the same 
tactic, namely the blocking of the intentions of other competeting. There is no 
public formulation of interests or negotiation of a compromise. There is no 
reason why this should be a cause for surprise. Precisely in the authoritarian 
peasant state (on this concept, cf. Spittler 1982) there is an absence of any 
generalized medium for formulating interests. There are no generally accessible 
channels for the articulation of demands of target groups, and there are no social 
structures for negotiating compromises. This situation by no means applies to all 
developing countries. However, it is characteristic of most of the least developed 
countries (LLDCs) of Black Africa which do not have a developed written 
culture.
Western societies, on the other hand, are characterized by public information 
as a medium for negotiation. In the West, values are questioned, debated and re-
formulated. "Public" esteem is created by the evaluation of individual action on 
the projection screen of public debate: public information is structured through 
specific channels, allowing differing interests to enter into the negotiating 
processes. The media play a central role in the formation of public information. 
Thus, we can always assume that our opponents in a conflict have some partial, 
but not irrelevant knowledge of our objectives and strategies. There is also a 
consensus on the limits of these strategies.
The characteristic feature of many African development projects, however, is 
the inadequate dissemination of information about opposing interests and 
strategies, and uncertainty with regard to the limits of these strategies. The 
"development aid world" in countries in which a majority of the population is 
illiterate is generally limited to administrative communication systems with 
their heavily filtered and distorted information. In a situation like this, actual 
processes of combat of diverging interests are successfully concealed by the 
rhetoric of common interests. The planners are frequently totally unaware of the 
constraints under which African small farmers operate (Olivier de Sardan 1988).
We will now turn to three examples of peasant activities which run counter
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to usual project assumptions. First, every external investment represents the 
placing of a bet in a game in which the various social groups are attempting to 
gain advantages for themselves in order to strengthen their economic position. 
The "common good", "community development", "national objectives", etc. are 
ideological legitimizations which veil these strategies. Secondly, it is the 
availability of labour, and not of land - even in densely populated cultivation 
zones of Africa, such as the south of Benin - which is frequently the major 
bottleneck in the agricultural economy. The farmers' strategies are aimed at 
overcoming this bottleneck, either by using labour-saving devices (e. g. wells or 
bicycles) or by ways of mobilizing labour. Thirdly, in a situation of limited trust 
in general legal rules and in view of the absence of a national social security 
network, the safety of conditions of life can only be achieved through reciprocal 
exchange, the exchange of dowries, or clientelist relationships. In this context 
we can observe the strategy of minimization of risks (Scott 1976; Bierschenk, in 
print).
It is, however, necessary to pay greater attention to the less overt actions of 
farmers and urban groups - from reformist religious movements through secret 
societies and anti-witchcraft associations to local political resistance movements 
- in order to be able to understand the reasons for the failure of development 
projects (Kohnert 1983; Geschiere/Klei 1986). Actions by the little man are 
frequently misunderstood as a mere strategy of securing material living 
conditions. But these forms of action are also stimulated by the concept of how 
the future should be and by images of personal identity which society should 
recognize and/or create (on this, cf. Streiffeler, in press). To interpret the 
cultures of African smallholder systems or to see them as being determined 
simply by technological backwardness and demographic pressure results in a 
rather flat picture of peasant life, concealing their creativity and inherent 
dynamism (on this, cf. e.g. Lachenmann 1988 and Lentz 1988).
5. What Should be Done?
Development aid will never be abandoned. It was being practised even before 
this name was invented. Driven by the economic need to expropriate colonial 
resources, and ideologically legitimized by attempts to missionize and "civilize 
the blacks", it was already being practised in the early twenties by the colonial 
masters. In Europe it arose from subsidies, e. g. as payments motivated by foreign 
policy considerations, as a more cost-effective alternative to political 
engagements by force.6 In Germany, it was Frederick II of Prussia and 
Brandenburg who developed it into a systematic instrument of policy. If we 
conceive of development aid as sudsidies - as a type of foreign policy, as
"chequebook diplomacy" - then we must certainly assume that there is hardly 
any government which will ever abandon it.
If our conclusions should prove to be accurate, can recommendations be 
derived from them for project implementation? Despite scepticism about the 
demand, frequently prematurely raised by donor agencies, that academic 
criticism is valid only when linked with direct proposals for implementation on 
the one hand, and running the danger of being "excommunicated" from the 
community of pure science because of too close a proximity to practice on the 
other, our analyses seem to imply three conclusions: first, concerning the 
relationship between development policy and foreign policy pressure, e. g. the 
enforcement of human rights; second, concerning the methods of our own work 
- sociological research; and third, concerning consultancy on development 
projects.
The findings of field research in Africa, to which we have referred here, show 
that the fate of individual development measures can best be understood from a 
historical perspective, with due regard to the overall social and socio-cultural 
context. This perspective uncovers social transformation processes which pre-
date development projects, and which will probably still exist long after these 
have fulfilled their purpose, as the projects themselves are often transformed by 
these historical dynamic processes. In general, therefore, development aid 
seems, to an impartial observer, to be an infusion of external resources into 
ongoing social processes. This fuels old and new conflicts over the redistribution 
of resources. The old tenet of classical economics that the increase in the wealth 
of a nation is essentially dependent on the successful reform of the social 
structure - an idea neglected by neo-classical economics for almost a century7 -
is once again becoming fashionable in the course of the discussion about 
democratization and structural adjustment in Africa.
The characteristic feature of the majority of attempts of development aid is 
rather the blocking of self-organized innovation by the massive dominance of 
administratively decreed or ordered innovations. In the majority of cases in 
which development aid has really contributed towards visible changes, we 
observe the introduction of rigid social arrangements which frequently lead to a 
reduction of the security of survival. This gives rise to the suspicion that 
development aid has, to date, made more of a contribution toward involution 
than to social evolution.
5.1  Technical or Social Co-operation?
In concluding a discussion on "the consequences of development aid in rural 
Africa"8, an African colleague stated that it is not so much an improvement in 
technology transfer which is required, but rather a new "project of society",
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meaning that with the existing social and political structures the viability and 
sustainability of technology transfer cannot be assured. Agricultural projects 
are, for example, frequently regarded as surrogates for a better agricultural 
policy. Propaganda is used to persuade farmers to produce more in a situation in 
which the particular interests of urban consumers are supported by an unjust 
price policy. We are not aware of a single report on a successful project having 
been undertaken under the negative conditions of a national "anti-agricultural 
policy" (Elwert 1983a; Bates 1983). A change in the overall political and 
economic policy could achieve higher food output and thus make many 
agricultural development projects superfluous. Where the state consciously 
abolishes on paper low fixed cereal prices, but each trader can be threatened in 
the classical command state, without any authorization, by the bureaucrats of the 
agricultural ministry and their allies in the local administrations and police, cereal 
production will remain inadequate. Only the actual abolition of this state 
marketing monopoly (e.g. in Mali this was brought about by external pressure) 
creates the necessary incentives for the farmers (see Anhut 1987). A conclusion 
to be drawn from this would be to concentrate development aid more heavily on 
policy advice and, at the same time, to promote the development of self-
determining, decentralized administrative decision-making structures.
The possibility of targeting "development projects" at achieving social 
change should not be overestimated. Projects always involve intervention in 
extremely complex social processes. In the language of target-oriented project 
planning (ZOPP) procedures, the central issue is not so much the strategic and 
project objectives, but the assumptions about the underlying social conditions 
upon which a project, by its nature, has very little influence. Even if ZOPP 
theoreticians may consider this statement a platitude, it is nevertheless very 
quickly forgotten in the efforts, in everyday project work. Projects, by 
definition, are restricted in their scope and in time. Paradoxically, they are 
intended to be effective in the short run where a social environment of inter-
relationships with long-term dynamics dominates.
It is, therefore, not easy to share the unreserved optimism of a World Bank 
sociologist in its plea for social engineering of participation (Carnea 1985). If 
development aid is not to become a delusion for altruistic voters and taypayers, it 
will have to be subjected to more stringent conditions. There are other factors 
which could have a greater influence on social development than individual 
projects - even if spending on such projects were to be tripled, as is frequently 
demanded, namely fundamental public rights of information, such as the 
freedom of speech and the press, the principle of the legal state, which makes 
government action predictable, and institutionalized forms of democracy, which 
lead to the negotiation of compromises instead of blocking tactics
and sabotage. This should, however, not divert attention from the necessity to 
change world economic conditions in favour of developing countries.
5.2 The Need for Sociological Analyses
If projects are to have any prospect of success, an essential condition for this is 
a comprehensive analysis of the social and cultural systems in which far-
reaching interventions are planned. Despite all the fashionable demands for more 
intensive consideration of "socio-cultural factors", it is extremely rare for 
sociological analyses, let alone a historical perspective of the development 
process, to form the basis for project planning. Still today, planners usually avoid 
basing project approaches on a fundamental knowledge of those societies and 
cultures in which they plan far-reaching technical intervention. Socio-
anthropological studies of the indigenous knowledge systems of the farmers 
targeted by development aid are virtually non-existent in the German-speaking 
world, and are still marginal even in the UK, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. If 
at all, sociologists and antropologists are usually consulted on development 
projects only if problems occur in their implementation, or if it is necessary to 
produce socio-cultural background papers based on temporary, three-week local 
research. The "socio-cultural" expert is then usually confronted with a peculiar 
understanding of his role. It is more or less expected of him to come up with
some trick or other, with which project management can successfully sell the 
project message to the "target group". In this interpretation, sociology and 
anthropology are actually reduced to social technology. A sad illustration of this 
technocratic curtailment is the conception of a rural extension service which 
borders on the military style of recruit-training (encadrement in French) —
attitudes which unfortunately have still not completely died out amongst 
development experts. Instead, the function of a social scientist in a project 
should primarily be that of a mediator arguing for the target group, and an 
interpreter of opinions which would otherwise not be brought into the discussion 
process (cf. Rauch, in press). Moreover, sociological studies should not be 
restricted simply to the evolution of the project development, but should also 
include the socio-economic transformation processes prior to and following the 
running period of the project.
5.3 The Major Task of Project Implementation: Mediation between Strategic 
Croups
Development aid projects seem to us to make sense only if they contribute 
towards improving both communication between all the "strategic groups"
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involved about their visions and plans for constructing a better future. This 
should not be confused with the progressive-sounding, but mostly completely 
ineffective promotion of "the" (African) small farmers as the major, if not only, 
legitimate actors of social development. Like every collective consciousness, the 
indigenous development attitudes of African small farmers are socially and 
historically based. Therefore they cannot, on their own, be seen as vision for the 
entire society. For this, a wider perspective at the nation state level (or e. g. in 
the case of environmental questions, at an even wider level) is necessary.
The question as to whether small farmers or planners have the appropriate 
view of development objectives, conditions and limitations seems to us to be 
the wrong question. The truth does not lie in a specific future design restricted to 
one social stratum or class but in the possibility of these different interest 
groups communicating with one another. However, we need to be wary here of 
succumbing to the illusion of a non-authoritarian dialogue on the idealized 
model of a university seminar or a planning workshop. Dialogue and the 
establishment of a public information system do not per se break down existing 
power relationships: they are however able to illuminate them. Questions of 
development are thus inseparable from those of accountability, legitimacy and 
democracy. Maybe planners, experts and development aid workers, instead of 
collaborating with a command state, should see themselves as ambassadors of an 
open society.
Bierschenk, T. Forster and T. Zitelmann. A number of African and German 
colleagues also collaborated on the project. The views expressed here - unless 
otherwise stated by reference to specific quotations from other writers -
represent only the views of the authors themselves. However, we would like to 
thank everyone else who has worked on the project, and our colleagues in the 
associated foreign research projects, for the stimulating discussions from which 
the deliberations presented here arose. For a full survey of the individual pieces of 
research carried out within the framework of this project, see Zitelmann 1989. 
The findings of regional studies were presented at the Congress of the European 
Society for Rural Sociology at Braga in 1986 under the theme of "Aid and 
Development", and published in special edition 1988.2/ 3 of Sociologia Ruralis. 
A selection of the major findings will be presented in Bierschenk/Elwert (in 
print).
4 See Kohnert/Preuss, 1990 for a critical analysis of the method of planning by 
objectives (ZOPP) in project implementation.
5 A way in which these conflicts of interests could be revealed and played 
through would be by using planning games, a method which has thus far not 
been used in project planning (cf. Bierschenk et al. 1989).
6 On antiquity, cf. Altheim 1962.
7 A brilliant analysis of the linkage between economic and social-structural 
analysis in the works of the classical political economists, especially Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo, and also of the reasons for the systematic exclusion of 
all social aspects in neo-classical economics, is provided by Walsh/Gram 1980.
8 Gervais Athawet at the Congress of the European Society for Rural 
Sociology, Braga, Portugal 1986.
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C. Scherler and T. Zitelmann, for their dedication in taking on both the 
considerable health risks of a field study and the frequently disappointing and 
endless chore of evaluation. Special thanks to our Berlin colleague S. Randeira 
for discussion of this text.
2 A current survey of the literature is given by Whiteman (1991) and Griffin 
(1991).
3 The working groups referred to are those at the universites of Amsterdam, 
London and Wageningen, the CRNS in conjunction with the Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris and Marseille) and the ORSTOM in France. A 
similar approach has also been adopted by a working group in the framework 
of the EIDOS network (University of Amsterdam, FU Berlin, Bielefeld, SO AS 
(London) and Wageningen). (On this, cf. Boiral et al. 1985; Elwert & Bierschenk 
1988; Long 1990; Olivier de Sardan 1985). - The German research project, the 
"Socio-structural Consequences of Development Aid in Rural West Africa", 
was supported by the Volkswagen Foundation. It was conceived by D. 
Kohnert and G. Elwert, and directed in conjunction with T.
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Abstract: This article is based on field studies in rural West Africa. It concentrates on the 
socio-structural effects of development aid in the long run, in contrast to numerous 
available evaluation reports on the short-run effects of development projects. The study 
reveals that superficial generalisations or condemnations of development projects, like the 
big farmers benefit at the expense of the smaller ones, or the men benefit at the expense of 
the women, do not hold up to verification. Quite to the contrary one observes a wide range 
of specific adapted forms by which the target groups react to the demands and offers of 
development projects, and thereby transform their own social structure. In short, one 
observes a great diversity of social self-organisation. The bureaucratic structures of the 
development administration do, however, unfortunately - more often than not - ignore the 
social dynamic of their target groups which they nevertheless sustain unconsciously. 
Development aid has become an important political and economic factor in most African 
countries. Its financial impact often exceeds that of the national budget. It contributes, 
therefore, significantly to the development of a bureaucratic class and of its clients: the 
project development degenerates into a project nationalization / bureaucratization. This 
contrasts vividly with the strategies of the peasants. Men and women at village level do not 
accept any longer the paternalistic development approach. They just select what they need 
out of the packages of solutions that are offered to them, while they develop their own 
solutions, like a variety of seeds adapted to their specific resource endowments, diversified 
sources of income, different strategies of accumulation and risk prevention. All this allows 
for a gradual evolution by variation and selection. The dynamic of the rural society is to a 
large extent due to a competition of different (strategic) groups, opposed to one another, 
about the partitioning of the cake of development aid. Normally this struggle between 
different vested interests is covered up by the rhetoric of development planning. Planned 
development has up to now proven to be to rigid, to be able to take account of the complex 
and subtle fabric of self organisation. Aid sometimes appears to be a second best substitute 
for a vision of a democratic society. This is due to the fact that the structures we are 
aiming for in the long run - which are to allow for open markets, an orientation of the 
producers at the resources and needs of the nation, and last not least, the growth of 
indigenous structures of self-help - would require a responsible and democratic 
government, as well as the guarantee of civil rights, accountability, an independent 
judiciary, freedom of the press, etc.; up to now, however, all these elements are still 
oppressed by the commando state itself, well nourished by the various forms of technical 
and financial aid.
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